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I. INTRODUCTION
In the divide between law and justice, individuals often propend for
justice and find law. When it comes to international law, individuals might
not even find any law, let alone the sacred ideal of justice. Neither was
international law originally conceived for directly applying to individuals,
nor was any court purposefully created for adjudicating their claims. 1 Yet,
this major gap is prominently perceived when industrial installations and
environmental degradation either affect or threaten to affect individuals’
life. What is the role of international law in adjudicating environmentrelated claims which are put forward by individuals or non-state parties?
The insight to understand how international law and domestic law are
intertwined is not a novel one. Nor is the factual and normative assumption
that individuals are sometimes able to invoke international law norms
specifically in domestic courts rather than in international settings.
Nevertheless, attempts to understand whether international law is apt to
offer a repository of underused assets for advancing the “sacred” idea of
justice in a specific case, before the case appears in court, might be an
interesting one. Not only would domestic courts provide a more proximate
and familiar environment for individuals than international settings, but
they would also be better placed to mandate scientific assessments and
issue enforceable reliefs. Yet, international law is not always easy to adapt
neither to domestic courts nor to specific legal claims.
Kivalina, a community in Northwest Alaska, has recently encountered
many setbacks in the courts of the United States, in what one may
characterize as a long and bitter environmental confrontation with major
corporations, both in terms of climate change litigation and on account of
water degradation due to the operation of the Red Dog Mine, one of the
largest mines worldwide.
In this paper, I will attempt to address Kivalina’s water issues that still
appear outstanding and not addressed after long years of purely domestic
litigation in the courts of the United States. This article will proceed as
follows. Part II.A will address the reasons why it is advisable that
international law be implemented, among other means, within domestic
courts. Parts II.B and II.C hinge on the different approaches U.S. courts
have applied toward international law and how international law can play
out in future environmental claims. I will then consider the factual matters
and case posture of Kivalina claims under Part III.A, with specific reference
to the shortcomings of domestic litigation and the outstanding claims
related to the pollution of water under Part III.B. Under Part III.C, I will
identify which water claims should still be addressed, and how this can be
1.
ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 142–44, 376–77 (2nd ed., Oxford University
Press 2005).
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done by looking at the United Nations’ Law of the Sea Convention (LOS
Convention) in order to test the following hypothesis: would Kivalina
residents be able to invoke specific provisions of the LOS Convention in
order to have their claims better addressed in courts of the United States?
In the affirmative, what techniques could be deployed, in light of past and
present approaches of U.S. courts, and specifically the U.S. Supreme Court,
vis-à-vis international law? I conclude by arguing that Kivalina residents
are able to advance water-related claims by relying on the interpretation of
domestic statutes consistent with the LOS Convention. Most specifically, I
will hold that both common law and statutory remedies can be triggered
effectively by relying on the customary character of some of the
environmental provisions contained in the LOS Convention, as summarized
in Part IV.
The foregoing hypothetical is based on a number of assumptions and
limitations. I am assuming that Kivalina residents are/will be willing to
engage in litigation, rather than Alternative Dispute Resolution. Moreover,
I am specifically considering the available information in public domain
documents, yet the factual characterization of the case is necessarily more
complex. Furthermore, notwithstanding the host of issues that might be
addressed, I am going to tailor down this account to solely water issues,
which will not be assessed through multiple sources of international law,
but solely by hinging on the LOS Convention.2 Most fundamentally, I am
going to select exclusively some provisions under the LOS Convention that
may be applicable. The chosen wording for addressing the difference
between U.S. states and States at international law rests on qualifying U.S.
states as states and states at international law as States.
II. THE MIXED FUEL OF U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
The implementation of international law is not a given. All the more
so, the implementation of international law in domestic courts is
specifically challenging due to the host of rules and approaches on how to
domesticate internationally binding law within domestic legal orders.
In order to prepare the groundwork for a prospective application of
international law to the Kivalina case, I will evaluate whether and why a
given legal order should aim as much as possible at a mixed fuel, namely a
combination of domestic and international law to be applied by judges for
the resolution of controversies, especially in environmental matters. I will
then sketch the historical trajectory along which U.S. courts have variedly
applied international law. The ultimate aim is to appraise the likelihood for
U.S. courts to make any use of international law in environmental cases, in
2.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Oct. 12, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Convention on the Law of the Sea].
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light of the most recent judgments. I will conclude by arguing that U.S.
courts are not as unfriendly to international law as some scholarship has
depicted them, however, a vein of self-restraint specifically emerges when
environmental claims are advanced through the Alien Tort Claims Act.
A. Do We Actually Need a Mixed Fuel?
If we look at the law as a fuel for development and prosperity, the
preservation of the environment and cohesive communities, it would not be
hard to understand that there is still a long way for environmental laws to
achieve the most effective fuel composition. Almost in every country,
environmental laws are in place, but their enforcement is extremely difficult
as some instances may exemplify. In South Africa, a middle-income
country, transition to democracy has made way for environmental policies
and legislation, but domestic agencies have faltered to enforce
environmental law.3 Conversely, in such a developed country as the United
States, notwithstanding innovative policies,4 enforcement is still critical,
and a survey has shown that two-thirds of U.S. corporate counsels admitted
that their companies had recently violated environmental laws.5
If the law enforcement apparatus is not effective and responsive to
societal concerns on environmental depletion, individuals usually turn to
domestic courts. But what happens if domestic law is not protective
enough? If domestic law is narrowly characterized, i.e. as a body of
normative rules that are domestically produced, individuals might not be
able to find any effective judicial remedy and courts will not play their
established role in the dynamics of checks and balances.
I believe, however, that domestic law can be effectively supplemented
by an additional ingredient to the fuel of prosperity, environmental
protection and cohesiveness, namely international law. This would result
from either application or interpretation. By way of application, domestic
courts are incrementally able and prone to apply international law even
when the latter has not been fully implemented internally, at either the
legislative or executive level (direct application).6
By way of
3.
Angela Mathee, Environment and Health in South Africa:
Opportunities, 32 J. PUB. HEALTH POL'Y 537–43 (2011).

Gains, Losses, and

4.
See Final Policy Statement on Incentives for Self-Policing of Violations, 65 FED. REG. 19,
618 (2000) (the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has incentivized self-policing of violations,
given the multitude of sources of pollution and the difficulties of monitoring them all at a centralized
level).
5.
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION LAW 1071 (Wolters Kluwer
ed., 7th ed. 2000).
6.
Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L. J 2347, 2349
(1991); Simon Marsden, Invoking Direct Application and Effect of International Treaties by the
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interpretation, national courts are often able, and sometimes specifically
required, to construe and apply national law in such a manner that any
conflict with international rules is prevented (consistent interpretation or
the Charming Betsy canon).7 More generally, the types of international
obligations that I will look after in this paper are ‘inward-looking
obligations,’ namely obligations undertaken by the specific State in the
capacity of international actor, in relation to its conduct within its domestic
jurisdiction rather than with other States on the international plane.8
This emerging practice, which has been characterized by Lord
Bingham as almost unimaginable in the past,9 is progressively leading to a
new branch of international law dubbed comparative international law.10
Techniques of implementation differ widely and bring about a variety of
results according to each domestic system,11 yet the domestication of
international law is not contingent to specific domestic cases, but also
contributes to the development and enforcement of international law more
broadly.12 In fact, the implementation of specific international law norms at
domestic level signals and strengthens their legitimacy, allowing for their
overall enforcement according to Thomas Franck’s theory of compliance;
what is more, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has consistently
portrayed domestic courts’ decisions as reflective of international
customary law, and the implementation of specific international law norms
would ease out and fasten the identification of customary rules.13
European Court of Justice: Implications for International Environmental Law in the European Union,
60 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 737, 738–40 (2011); ANDRÉ NOLLKAEMPER, NATIONAL COURTS AND THE
INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW 117–18 (2011); Dinah Shelton, Introduction to INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEMS INCORPORATION, TRANSFORMATION AND PERSUASION 11–13 (Dinah
Shelton ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2011).
7.
Rebecca Crootof, Judicious Influence: Non-Self-Executing Treaties and the Charming
Betsy Canon, 120 YALE L. J. 1784 (2011).
8.
Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Domestic Courts as the Natural Judge of International Law: A
Change in Physiogonomy in 3 SELECT PROCEEDINGS OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 155–68 (James Crawford & Sarah Nouwen eds., Hart Publ’g 2011); see THE ROLE OF THE
DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY ENFORCEMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 1–60 (David Sloss ed.,
Cambridge U. Press 2009) [hereinafter STUDY]; see also David Sloss, Treaty Enforcement in Domestic
Courts: A Comparative Analysis, in THE ROLE OF THE DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY ENFORCEMENT:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY 1–60 (David Sloss ed., Cambridge U. Press 2009) [hereinafter Analysis].
9.
Lord Bingham, Foreword to SHAHEED FATIMA, USING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
DOMESTIC COURTS, at xi (Hart Publ'g 2005).
10.
Anthea Roberts, Comparative International Law? The Role of the National Courts in
Creating and Enforcing International Law, 60 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 57, 60 (2011).
11.

CASSESE, supra note 1, at 224.

12.

Roberts, supra note 10, at 58.

13.
THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (Oxford University
Press 1990); see Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J.
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Nonetheless, international law is no panacea to the shortcomings of
domestic environmental law. As a “global environmental crisis”14 is
unfolding, international environmental conventions and soft law are at their
apex, yet enforcement often lacks teeth15 and even domestic measures are
sometimes “exported,” making for their (extraterritorial) application in
place of the feeble and fragile specter of international law.16 Yet, exporting
domestic legislation—albeit highly protective—is a byword for diplomatic
hostility and non-coordinated, therefore inefficient, implementation of
common legal rules and principles. For this reason, I am herein
propounding the vision of a mixed fuel scenario of domestic law and
international law as intertwined tools for incrementally addressing
environmental issues that local communities in general, and the Kivalina
community in particular, are faced with.
B. The Mixed Fuel in U.S. Courts: An Overview from the Bench
In order to understand whether the mixed fuel of international and
domestic law might work in the case of Kivalina, which should be
advanced in U.S. courts, I will here overview the historical posture of U.S.
courts vis-à-vis international law, with no intent to provide an exhaustive
line of cases.
Notwithstanding the fairly clear interplay between international and
national law under the monistic and dualistic doctrines,17 the enforcement
of international law in U.S. courts has been characterized as one of “the
‘most confounding’ in the United States law of treaties.”18 Within the
perspective of the present contribution, it is safe to contend that the
confusion is not limited to the United States’ law of treaties, but also vastly
affects the status of international law in U.S. courts, as well as the tools that
are available for individuals to vindicate their rights in court. When and
how do treaties create judicially enforceable individual rights in U.S.
courts?
Rep. 3, ¶¶ 56–58 (Feb. 14); Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign
and International Law by National Courts, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 241, 248 (2008).
14.
DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 269
(University Casebook Series, 5th ed., Foundation Press 2015).
15.

Id. at 367; see some notable exceptions to this assertion id. at 404, 405.

16.

Id. at 1455.

17.
CASSESE, supra note 1, at 213; John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal
Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 310, 311 (1992).
18.
Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties 89 AM. J. INT’L L.
695, 695 (1995) (quoting United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876 (5th Cir. 1979)); David Sloss, SelfExecuting Treaties and Domestic Judicial Remedies 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 346, 509 (2004)
[hereinafter Remedies].
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The choice of U.S. courts for my hypothesis on the Kivalina case is
mainly due to three reasons. Firstly, Kivalina is located in Northwest
Alaska, namely the 49th State of the Union, so that any remedy to be
devised for Kivalina at the domestic level will be set in a U.S. court.19
Secondly, U.S. judges appear to be a good example of a disinterested third
party able to determine the merits of even complex disputes, which is the
assumption of any enforcement of international law in domestic courts.20
Moreover, the case-law trajectory on the interaction between U.S. and
international law epitomizes some of the most fundamental challenges that
a national judiciary faces when approaching international law.
U.S. courts are presently not regarded as particularly international lawfriendly.21 Yet, it strikes to note that in 1972, Justice Powell characterized
domestic courts as the “the best means for the development of a respected
body of international law ‘[u]ntil international tribunals command a wider
constituency.’”22
The very origins of the United States as a country rest with
international law. The Federalist Papers extensively mentioned the role of
the law of nations in U.S. courts, and the Constitution bestowed the judicial
power of the United States not only to cases arising under the Constitution
and the laws of the United States, but also to cases arising under treaties,
and specific controversies of an international kind.23 According to the
majestic expression of the U.S. Constitution, “all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land,” which judges are bound to enforce “any Thing
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”24
For this reason, U.S. courts and legislators initially viewed customary
international law and treaty obligations as part of domestic law.25
Indeed, the Supreme Court took the constitutional wording very
seriously, as illustrated in Ware v. Hylton, where it held that a treaty

19.

Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 2012).

20.

Tzanakopoulos, supra note 8, at 157.

21.
Koh, supra note 6, at 2356–58; Benvenisti, supra note 13, at 248 (sometimes, courts
cannot be international-law friendly on account of statutes prohibiting any reference to so-called foreign
law); Tzanakopoulos, supra note 8, at 166 (citing Oklahoma’s constitutional amendments to prohibit
State courts to consider Sharia law or international law or indeed “the legal precepts of other nations or
cultures.” The Amendment passed by referendum in 2011).
22.

First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 775 (1972).

23.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Koh, supra note 6, at 2352 (citing the internationalist approach
enlivened in the Federalist Papers).
24.

U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; Remedies, supra note 18, at 508.

25.
Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese
Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 868 (1987).
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overrules all State laws upon the subject.26 Until 1860, the Supreme Court
gave no deference to the executive branch’s interpretation of treaties,27 but
it rather vigorously enforced international law to the detriment of statutes,
and more sparsely interpreted the Constitution itself in light of international
treaties.28
An abrupt change occurred in mid-nineteenth century, when the
Supreme Court started denying treaties’ status of federal law,29 under the
comity exception, the separation-of-powers and related political question
doctrine, as well as the judicial incompetence exception.30
Firstly, under the comity exception, which was further asserted
through the act of state doctrine, the Supreme Justices decided not to
adjudicate on “the acts of the government of another,”31 for sake of a
‘comity’ exception,32 further declaring that no federal common law could
govern the case “except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or
by acts of Congress.”33
Secondly, the separation-of-powers exception revolved around the
separation-of-powers disclaimer, by which the Supreme Court inaugurated
a phase of deference to the President of the United States,34 and more
generally to the executive power of states. Self-restraint was no more

26.
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (1796); David Sloss et al., International Law in the Supreme
Court to 1860, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 13
(Cambridge U. Press 2011) [hereinafter Supreme Court].
27.

Supreme Court, supra note 26, at 17.

28.
Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 15 (2006);
Supreme Court, supra note 26, at 41 (where the international law-bound interpretation of the
Constitution is deemed more opportunistic than with statutes).
29.
Duncan B. Hollis, Treaties in the Supreme Court, 1861–1900 INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
US SUPREME COURT CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 55–59, 60, 61–88 (David L. Sloss et al. eds.,
Cambridge U. Press 2011).
THE

30.

Koh, supra note 6, at 2357.

31.
Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (noting that "every sovereign State is
bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State"); see Oetjen v. Central Leather Co,
246 U.S. 297, 303–04 (1918) (act of State doctrine “rests at last upon the highest considerations of
international comity and expediency"); see also Ricaud v. American Metal Co, 246 U.S. 304 (1918);
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
32.

Koh, supra note 6, at 2357.

33.
Erie R Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (a case of diversity jurisdiction on civil
liability overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842)).
34.
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (holding that “the
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations—a power
which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, like every
other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the
Constitution.”).
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applied in light of mere comity to other countries, but was rather entrenched
in the U.S. separation of powers system, by which any question entailing
determinations on the legality of foreign states’ acts was tantamount to a
political question,35 which appertain to the political branch’s prerogatives.
It is no coincidence that such shift happened quite lately, and precisely in
the 1930s and 40s,36 when alliances were sought and wars waged.37
Thirdly, the Supreme Court branched out the separation-of-powers
doctrine into a new exception, namely the judicial incompetence exception,
by which “the very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is
political, not judicial,”38 thus banning not only findings of fact in
international cases, but also the very activity of interpretation regarding
international law and foreign affairs law.39
Besides the three exceptions, more interpretive hurdles were set forth
by the courts. It might have very well been that the wave of human rights
treaties, which swept and reshaped international law after the Second World
War, increasingly put pressure on the U.S. judiciary, and prompted federal
and state courts to hammer out a more defined doctrine of non-selfexecuting treaties, which must be domesticated into national law by a
statute to become the “Law of the Land.”40 The judge-made distinction
between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties kept percolating in
the case law as long as the Cold War era ensued, and the need for protecting
U.S. governmental actions might have been one of the reasons for
upholding such a theory.41
A new trend favoring international law was impressed back again in
such decisions as Mendoza-Martinez and Afroyim on denaturalization laws,
35.

United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

36.

See generally United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).

37.

See generally Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 311.

38.

Chicago & S Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Co., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).

39.

Koh, supra note 6, at 2358.

40.
See, e.g., Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718 (1952); Pauling v. McElroy, 278 F.2d 252
(D.C. Cir. 1960) (individual may not invoke the UN Charter to enjoin detonation of test nuclear
weapons in Marshall Islands); Vlissidis v. Anadell, 262 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1959) (alien may not resist
deportation on ground that U.N. Charter superseded racist provisions of immigration laws); See
Remedies, supra note 18, at 20. But see Hollis, supra note 29, at 76; Lori Fisler Damrosch, Medellin
and Sanchez-Llamas: Treaties from John Hay to John Roberts INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 460 (David L. Sloss et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press
2011) (according to some commentators, the doctrine of non-self-executing treaties was first shaped in
Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829)) (the distinction Foster drew between self-executing and non-selfexecuting treaties, did not prove a hurdle in the judicial enforcement of treaties. The most extensive
discussion of the issue case in a dissent by Justice Field in Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887)).
41.
Koh, supra note 6, at 2362; Banco Nacional de Cuba, 376 U.S. at 398 (which also dates
back to the Cold War era and is a landmark decision on the act of state doctrine).
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which the Court struck down by relying on the Law of Nations.42 The
Eighth Amendment also prominently became a fertile ground for citing
foreign and international sources.43 With Filártiga v. Peña-Irala,44 a
branch of transnational public law litigation seemed to parallel the
achievements of domestic public law litigation45 in Federal courts under the
Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA or ATS, Alien Tort Statute).46
In Sosa the Supreme Court explained at length the “transnationalist”
approach historically applied in such decisions as Paquete Habana47 and
Nereide,48 but refrained from adjudicating ATS claims for violations of
“any international law norm with less definite content and acceptance
among civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar” when the
ATCA was enacted,49 and therefore “specific, universal, and obligatory.”50
The ATS-kind of law of nations, however, was understood as encompassing
even present-day norms of international law.51
The understanding of Sosa is still debated,52 yet it has been argued that
it bestows jurisdiction on Federal courts to decide on customary
international law status if no express interpretation is offered by the
political branches, which is a fairly balanced solution since judges are still
often perceived as unelected actors.53
Yet, the rise of transnational public law litigation was apparently
quelled in recent cases, such as Breard,54 Sanchez-Llamas,55 and Medellin
42.
Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 161
(1963) (citing the EMER DE VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS (1758) and HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF
TOTALITARIANISM (2007)).
43.

See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).

44.

See Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 442 U.S. 901 (1979).

45.
See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281 (1976).
46.

Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).

47.

The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 714 (1890).

48.

The Nereide, 13 U.S. 388, 423 (1815).

49.

Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 U.S. 2739, 2766 (2004).

50.

Id.

51.

Id. at 2761–62; see U.S. v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599 (2010).

52.

John O. McGinnis, Sosa and the Derivation of Customary International Law
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 481–93 (David L. Sloss et
al. eds., Cambridge U. Press 2011).
53.

Id. at 484.

54.

Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998); see Damrosch, supra note 40, at 458.

55.
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 U.S. 2669, 2679 (2006) (concerning the police not
informing a person under arrest or detention that he/she could request his/her own Consulate to be
notified of his/her detention).
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II.56 The latter decision is widely known for having further extended the
wall of separation between domestic law and international law by excluding
the automatic enforcement—absent implementing legislation—of ICJ
decisions when provisions at issue are not self-executing, in this case
Article 94 of the U.N. Charter.57
The legacy of this new line of decisions, and specifically of Medellin,
is a seeming presumption of non-self-execution of international law
norms,58 however enforcing environmental treaties and customary norms
requires a separate analysis, to which I will now turn.59
C.
The Enforcement of Environmental Treaties and Customary
International Law
With respect to environmental agreements, almost twenty years ago
they were considered non-self-executing60 more often than not. In a notable
case, involving the enforcement of international whaling quotas, the
Supreme Court seemed to set aside the political question doctrine61 by
maintaining that, “under the Constitution, one of the Judiciary’s
characteristic roles is to interpret statutes, and we cannot shirk this
responsibility merely because our decision may have significant political
overtones.”62 In some other instances, courts have not found provisions
specific enough to warrant their application,63 or applicable to non-state
parties.64
More generally, with concern to international agreements, U.S. courts
apply two different approaches that have been labeled as the nationalist
approach and the transnationalist approach.65 Under the nationalist
56.

Medellin v. Texas, 522 U.S. 491 (2008).

57.

U.N. Charter art. 94.

58.

Crootof, supra note 7, at 1787.

59.

Damrosch, supra note 40, at 453.

60.
Daniel Bodansky & Jutta Brunnée, The Role of National Courts in the Field of
International Environmental Law, 7 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 11, 113, 129 (1998).
61.

See Baker, 369 U.S. 186.

62.
Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) (at the end of
the decision, the Court cited Moby Dick by Melville).
63.

Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668 (1991).

64.
Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999); Defenders of Wildlife
Inc. v. Endangered Species Scientific Authority, 725 F.2d 726, 726 (1984) (the Court merely referred to
Article VI (2) of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna
(CITES) and then struck down administrative guidelines as incompatible with it); see CATHRIN
ZENGERLING, GREENING INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 57, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2013).
65.

Remedies, supra note 18, at 504.
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approach, courts deploy an array of interpretive tools as agents of the
domestic legal system only, while under the transnationalist approach
courts act as agents of both the domestic and international legal system, in a
sort of double role.66 Quite understandably, outcomes vary according to the
specific approach that courts discretionarily apply. Most notably, the
transnationalist approach is shown as the most favorable approach for the
advancement of international law in U.S. courts.67
According to recent empirical research on the subject, the
transnationalist conceptual framework is applied more often than the
nationalist approach when private parties are adverse to each other, rather
than to the government.68
When it comes to customary law, customs in environmental matters
have not been often invoked in court, however such a litigation strategy has
been attempted in some instances by hinging on the Alien Tort Claims
Act.69 In a specific case of alleged pollution of the rain forests and rivers in
Ecuador and Peru, a Federal court implied that a corporation could be liable
to indigenous people for breaches of international environmental law,70 but
later dismissed the claim on the forum non conveniens ground.71
Still, a recent attempt to have human rights law directly applied as
customary law in domestic courts brought about the landmark Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. lawsuit,72 characterizing ATCA as
presumptively against extraterritorial application in the absence of an
express declaration of extraterritoriality on the part of Congress, according
to the political question theory.73 Secondly, it maintained that ATCA can
be invoked only in “causes of action based on sufficiently definite norms of
international law,” namely norms that are “specific, universal, and
obligatory.”74
Not only is Kiobel relevant for environmental litigation, but it also
encapsulates the Supreme Court’s most recent attitude toward ATS
66.
Id. at 522; GEORGES SCELLE, PRÉCIS DE DROIT DES GENS:
SYSTÉMATIQUE pt. 2, at 10–12 (1934).
67.

PRINCIPLES ET

See Remedies, supra note 18, at 509.

68.
Id. at 532 (according to a recent empirical research, in cases where private parties are
adverse to each other, U.S. courts are more likely to apply transnationalist tools than nationalist tools,
whilst in government-party cases U.S. courts are more likely to apply nationalist tools than nationalist
tools).
69.

28 U.S.C. § 1350; see HUNTER ET AL., supra note 14 at 1380–90.

70.

Aguinda v. Texaco, 303 F.3d 470 (2nd Cir. 2002).

71.

See Change of Venue, 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2012).

72.

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 U.S. 1659 (2013).

73.

Id. at 1668; Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001).

74.

Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1664–65; Sosa,124 U.S. at 2766.
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litigation, which is all the more restrictive in light of the political question,
separation of powers and act of state theory.75
All in all, such a framework concerning the aptitude of U.S. courts to
either apply or interpret international law will be especially useful as soon
as it is applied to the specific facts of the Kivalina case, which will now be
considered.
III. THE KIVALINA CASE
In this section, I will illustrate the most relevant environmental
impacts that the Red Dog Mine is alleged to have caused on the Kivalina
community and the surrounding environment.
The Red Dog Mine is the United States’ largest mining polluter,
whose activities have been often countered by the nearby Kivalina
community. Three issues have principally arisen from its operation: the
effects of wind-blown ore dust and traffic air pollutants; the disruption of
animal migration; and the unlawful discharge of pollutants in riverine
waters as well as at the port site.
For the purposes of the present paper, I will tailor down the scope of
the research to water-related issues.
With reference to water protection from the operation of the mine,
Kivalina individuals currently perceive that many issues are still
outstanding, in spite of the long-battled lawsuits. Such a recount attempts
to make way for the application of my initial hypothesis stating the need for
a mixed fuel of domestic and international law in the case of Kivalina.
Most notably, I argue that water-related issues that have not been addressed
at domestic level could receive a more effective response through the
intertwinement of domestic law and international law.
A. Factual and Procedural Recount
The Red Dog Mine is a lead and zinc mine, and the most heavily
polluting facility in the United States,76 which was excavated and mined out
by Teck Alaska Incorporated (Teck) on the land owned by NANA
Development Corporation (NANA),77 approximately forty-six miles inland

75.

Koh, supra note 6.

76.
Toxic
Release
Inventory,
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://myrtk.epa.gov/info/report.jsp?IDT=TRI&ID=99752RDDGP90MIL [https://perma.cc/L3XX-TCR
G] (last visited Aug. 2, 2016) (showing Red Dog Mine ranking #1).
77.
CHRISTINE SHEARER, KIVALINA. A CLIMATE CHANGE STORY 79, 106–07 (Haymarket
Books 2011).
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from the coast of the Chukchi Sea.78 Teck is now excavating a nearby
deposit, the Aqqaluk Pit, which is also located on NANA land.79
In order to understand which norms of either treaty law or general
international law are applicable to the case, an overall assessment of the
mine’s environmental impact is in order.
Three main issues have arisen from the operation of the mine. Firstly,
the mine has been deemed responsible of emitting wind-blown ore dust and
traffic air pollutants, principally due to the transportation of mineral ore
from the Delong Mountain Transportation System (DMTS) to a Teck-run
nearby port.80 Secondly, environmental groups and native communities
have been vocal in reporting the disruption of animal migration, mainly due
to the use of the DMTS and the operation of the Aqqaluk Deposit.81 Lastly,
Teck has experienced waste-water discharge issues, inland and at the port
site on coastal/ocean waters.82 With reference to the port site, the Alaska
Spill Prevention Unit has also reported the occurrence of petroleum spills.83
All three types of alleged degradation were perceived by Kivalina
residents, an Iñupiat community living fifty-four miles southwest of the
mine on a thin long-barrier reef island located between the Chukchi Sea and
a lagoon at the mouth of the Kivalina River.84 Kivalina is perhaps best
known as the first village suing major fossil fuel companies on the ground
of their contribution to climate change,85 which is now disrupting not only
the subsistence life of Kivalina but also its own very existence.86
Subsistence is at danger due to the faster migration of animals to northern
colder areas, and related difficulties for hunters to provide the community

78.
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RECORD OF DECISION FOR THE RED DOG
MINE EXTENSION AQQALUK PROJECT 1 (2010).
79.

Id.

80.
Id. at 11. The 52-mile DeLong Mountain Regional Transportation System (DMTS) haul
road leads to port facilities located on the Chukchi Sea. The road has been of concern also for the fact
that it passes through the Cape Krusenstern National Monument. However, EPA stipulated with the
Alaska State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO) that no adverse impact would ensue if measures and
operational controls were included in the Cultural Resources Protection Plan (CRPP) presented by Teck,
which it did.
81.

Id. at 5.

82.
Red Dog Mine, STATE OF ALASKA CONTAMINATED SITES PROGRAM, http://
dec.alaska.gov/spar/csp/sites/reddog.htm (last visited Aug. 2, 2016).
83.

Id.

84.

SHEARER, supra note 77, at 101.

85.
Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 133 U.S. 2390 (2013); Kivalina, 696
F.3d at 849.
86.

SHEARER, supra note 77, at 101.
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with sufficient traditional food.87 Additionally, recurrent storms and the
rising sea level have put the community under physical and emotional
stress, with a majority of people voting for relocation.88 Indeed, the lawsuit
against the major fossil fuel companies on grounds of climate damages was
intended to collect the necessary funds for relocating the threatened village,
but it was unsuccessful.89
Action has recently been taken with former President Obama
requesting Congress to earmark $400 million “to cover the unique
circumstances confronting vulnerable Alaskan communities, including
relocation expenses for Alaska Native villages threatened by rising seas,
coastal erosion, and storm surges,” which would be administered by a
Coastal Climate Resilience Fund to be established at the Department of the
Interior.90
Nevertheless, given the difficulties in finding an alternative location
and the lack of governmental involvement, I am arguing that more efforts
need be devoted to understanding whether life as it is now in Kivalina can
be ameliorated by way of international law. Domestic law has often been
invoked, especially with reference to water-related issues, but not much has
been achieved, and people in Kivalina still characterize water as being one
of the most urgent challenges to be addressed.91
Given the limited aim of this paper, I will tailor down my quest for
domestic remedies through international law by considering only waterrelated issues that have been attributed to the Red Dog Mine and leaving
aside those contentions that the Kivalina community relates to wind-blown
ore dust and animal wildlife disruption. Both aspects will nonetheless come
up in relation to water issues. In case water claims are established, my
ultimate aim is to tentatively equip Kivalina people with tools to make them
justiciable, and achieve an enhanced quality of life.

87.

Id. at 76.

88.
Id. at 103–04; Glenn Gray et al., Kivalina Consensus Building Project: Results of Doorto-Door Survey (July 2010), http://www.relocate-ak.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/
Kivalina_survey_summary5.pdf.
89.

Kivalina, 133 U.S. at 2390; Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 849.

90.
See Chris Mooney, The Remote Alaskan Village That Needs to be Relocated Due to
Climate Change, WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energyenvironment/wp/2015/02/24/the-remote-alaskan-village-that-needs-to-be-relocated-due-to-climatechange/ [https://perma.cc/4DPT-EZ2T]; 'President Obama Proposes New Funding to Build Resilience
of Alaska’s Communities and Combat Climate Change' WHITE HOUSE FACT SHEET (Feb. 9, 2016),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/09/fact-sheet-president-obama-proposes-newfunding-build-resilience-alaskas [https://perma.cc/7BD4-LJK5].
91.

Gray, supra note 88.
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B. Water Issues and Responses at Domestic Law
In the present paragraph, I broach the specific mining processes
undertaken by Teck, which relate to the alleged degradation of water. After
considering the first site (the “Main Deposit”), I will turn to the newly-dug
Aqqaluk Deposit. Finally, I will look at the port facilities, which have been
serving both sites. In all instances, I will also highlight the procedural
history of the relevant environmental claims that have been brought
throughout time, notably by members of the Kivalina community.
Notwithstanding a host of claims, which have been adjudicated by
notoriously advanced courts, most of such water-related issues are still
outstanding, all the more so after the excavation of the second site, namely
the Aqqaluk Deposit.92
The Main Deposit started operating in 1989 and was mined out by
2011.93 It was subject to an Environmental Impact Assessment under
NEPA94 and both a point-source wastewater/stormwater permit and a
dredge-and-fill permit under the Clean Water Act (CWA).95 Ore was
removed from the open pit mine and milled to obtain zinc and lead
concentrates; tailings and process wastewater were impounded in a storage
area (tailings pond); from there, treated wastewater was discharged into the
Middle Fork of Red Dog Creek.96
What is here of concern is the wastewater permit, which is known as
the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination permit (NPDES), in that
Kivalina residents rely on that water—specifically, from the Wulik River—
for drinking, subsistence hunting and fishing, and aesthetic enjoyment.97
In 2002, six Kivalina residents filed a citizen enforcement suit under
section 505 CWA, documenting over 2,171 violations of Teck NPDES
permit, of which Teck admitted to more than 1,100.98 The ultimate aim was

92.

See ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d at 849.

93.

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 78, at 2.

94.
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–47 (2012) (under §
102(2)(C) NEPA, all major Federal actions “significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment” are to be accompanied by a “detailed statement.” Under 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (2016),
Major Federal Action, private projects requiring federal approval are also subject to NEPA).
95.
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012) (Teck was
specifically required to apply to and obtain a NPDES permit under § 402 CWA (EPA’s authority and a
dredge-and-fill permit under § 404 CWA (Army Corps of Engineers’ authority))) [hereinafter Clean
Water Act].
96.

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 78, at 2.

97.

33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387; SHEARER, supra note 77, at 113.

98.
James Macpherson, Village Claims Red Dog Contamination, COMMUNITY (Sept. 29,
2002, 8:00 PM), http://www.alaskajournal.com/community/2002-09-30/village-claims-red-dog-conta
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to ask the Court to enforce/have enforced the limit standards. The lawsuit
was eventually settled through consent decree with Teck purchasing reverse
osmosis units and good faith-pledging to build an effluent pipeline from the
Red Dog Mine to the Chukchi Sea.99 The interesting part of the settlement
comes about when it reads that, whether Teck Cominco decided not to build
the pipeline for good cause, it would pay a penalty of $8 million, or,
whether it did not build it without a good cause, then it would pay a penalty
of $20 million, both penalties apparently to the Federal Government.100
Turning to the Aqqaluk Deposit, major litigation arose after the EPA’s
issuance of its Record of Decision and new NPDES permit taking into
account the imminent reclamation of the Main Deposit and fast advancing
project for the Aqqaluk Deposit.101 Such issuance followed a complex
Teck-led Supplemental Environmental Impact Assessment (SEIS), which
convinced the EPA to permit the operations and discharges at the Aqqaluk
deposit, lower some of the effluent standards,102 and allow for selfcompliance by Teck coupled with periodic inspections on the part of the
Administration.103 For the fact that Kivalina and Port Hope residents did
not explain why such enforcement strategy was not sufficient, their appeal
was dismissed by both the Environmental Appeals Board and the Ninth
Circuit.104 The SEIS also clearly stated that maintenance of the two
deposits would be needed in perpetuity,105 with the concurrent need of
mination#.V-cOaVUrJEY; see Adams v. Teck Comnico Alaska Inc., No. 3:04–cv–00049–JWS, 2006
WL 2105501 (D. Alaska Jul. 28, 2006).
99.
Kivalina Settlement Summary, TECK, http://www.reddogalaska.com/DocumentViewer.as
px?elementId=128367&portalName=tc [https://perma.cc/VNW6-A5PF] (last visited Aug. 2, 2016).
100. Id. (another prong of the settlement dwelled on the compliance Teck pledged to the 1998
permit, as amended in 2003, with a major exception on Total Dissolved Solids (TDS), for which Teck
would have paid a penalty when non-compliance occurred).
101.

Native Village of Kivalina IRA Council v. EPA, 687 F.3d 1216 (9th Cir. 2012).

102. Red Dog Mine Extension—Aqqaluk Project: Final Supplemental Environmental Impact
Statement, TETRA TECH, INC., (Oct. 2009), http://dnr.alaska.gov/mlw/mining/largemine/reddog/
pdf/rdseis2009vol.1.pdf [hereinafter TETRA TECH, INC.] (most specifically, in their adjudicatory appeal
lodged with the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC), petitioners held that the
Alaska certification under § 401 CWA was violating the State’s Antidegradation Policy (no degradation
analysis plan was in place) and amounted to backsliding under CWA (§§ 402(o) and 303(d)(4)),
restricting the cases under which NPDES permit limits might be relaxed in case of permit renewal,
reissuance, or modification. Most notably the contested limits covered average monthly effluent limits
(AMEL) for lead, and the effluents limits for cyanide, zinc and TDS as compared to the 1998 permit
limits. A request for recusation was made towards ADEC’s Commissioner, who was appointed in 2007
by Alaska Governor Sarah Palin as Commissioner of the ADEC, after being Teck’s lawyer for a
decade).
103.

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 78, at 7–8.

104.

Native Village of Kivalina IRA Council, 687 F.3d at 1216.

105.

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 78, at 4.
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hazing activities to deter wildlife from using open water at the sites.106
There appears to be, however, no relevant plan in place to address this
specific issue.
All in all, the EPA approved the plan put forward by Teck. The EPA
approved Teck’s plan as the Preferred Alternative, yet the Environmentally
Preferable differed from what Teck proposed, and consisted of three
pipelines for transporting (i) concentrate to the port, (ii) wastewater to the
Chukchi Sea instead of the Middle Fork Red Dog Creek, and (iii) diesel
fuel from the port to the mine.107 The Preferred Alternative was identified
in the plan proposed by Teck because the EPA asserted not to have the
authority “to require construction of a pipeline and a separate marine
discharge, but rather this would be a separate permitting action in response
to an application provided by Teck.”108
Nevertheless, the EPA
acknowledged that the Preferred Alternative was identified precisely on the
basis of the SEIS, including an assessment of impacts that would result
from the construction and operation of the pipeline.109
Teck ultimately opted out of any wastewater pipeline project, lodging
a file with the U.S. District Court for Alaska that contained the findings of a
study it conducted.110
Yet, doubts that Alaskan officials will not be able to monitor the actual
release of water effluents are still looming over the wilderness of Alaska.
All the more so after the EPA tasked the Alaska Department of
Environmental Conservation (ADEC) with the NPDES permit program, a
decision that was unsuccessfully challenged in court.111
In June 2014, Kivalina residents faced a public health emergency as
Kivalina’s source of drinking water was contaminated due to an equipment

106. TETRA TECH, INC., supra note 1062 at 245; U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
supra note 78, at 47 (“EPA accepts that personnel may not be available to implement hazing practices
24 hours a day, seven days a week; however, we are confident that the measures Teck proposes will not
result in population-level effects to any species in the vicinity of the operation.”).
107.

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 78, at 6–7.

108.

Id. at 36.

109. TETRA TECH, INC., supra note 102, at 99 (the SEIS, upon which the Record of Decision is
based, at times appears to ground its assessment on the construction of a water pipeline, which is
“considered reasonably foreseeable in terms of cumulative effects,” on the basis of a future NEPA
action “once Teck finalizes its plans and submits an application to build and operate a wastewater
pipeline.”).
110.

Id. at 110.

111. Akiak Native Community v. U.S. EPA, 625 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010) (DEC started
administering wastewater and discharge permitting and compliance program for Alaska on October 31,
2012, after the passage of Senate Bill (SB 110) and EPA’s final approval in October 2008, under State
primacy).
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failure at the mine site.112 Teck recognized that the company failed to keep
Kivalina residents informed after the incident,113 and no specific action
appears to have ensued.
By way of difference, Kivalina residents have not brought issues
concerning the port along the Chukchi Sea from where Teck ships minerals
overseas. According to the Alaska Division of Spill Prevention and
Response, the entire transportation corridor (DMTS) from the mine to the
port, including the road, the port facilities, and the barges is under Alaska’s
Contaminated Sites Program, apparently due to escaping (“fugitive”) dust
from operations along the transportation corridor.114 The program is also
addressing historic spills of petroleum products at the mine.115 Still, risk
assessments have never covered organic compounds associated with past
petroleum hydrocarbon spills at the port site, allegedly because they occur
in localized areas and generally remain at depth or beneath pavement,
apparently being “not in a place where current human exposure occurs.”116
Moreover, it does not appear that the Corps made a decision to issue,
deny or update a Rivers and Harbor Act Section 10 permit for any work or
structures at the port sites.117
The EPA acknowledges the existence of a pollution issue concerning
the port site and nearby wetlands.118 In its Record of Decision to the SEIS,
it deemed wetlands already contaminated due to past and ongoing fugitive
dust emissions from the road.119 The latest independent study on fish

112. Jillian Rogers, After Red Dog Spill, Kivalina Issues Wulik River Water Advisory, THE
ARTIC SOUNDER (June 20, 2014), http://www.adn.com/article/20140620/after-red-dog-spill-kivalinaissues-wulik-river-water-advisory [https://perma.cc/6MLH-M942].
113.

Id.

114.

STATE OF ALASKA CONTAMINATED SITES PROGRAM, supra note 82.

115. Red Dog Mine, DIVISION OF SPILL PREVENTION AND RESPONSE CONTAMINATED SITES
PROGRAM, http://dec.alaska.gov/spar/csp/sites/reddog.htm [https://perma.cc/BN7T-BQKW] (last visited
Jan. 15, 2017) (Red Dog Mine sites are subject to the regulatory requirements under DEC Contaminated
Sites Program (CSP), pursuant to 18 AAC 75.360).
116.

Id.

117. Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1899); see generally United States v.
Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960); see generally United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S.
224 (1966).
118.

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 78, at 6.

119. Id. (the EPA concedes that a concentrate pipeline would have manifold beneficial effects.
It would avoid truck traffic, reduce fugitive dust emissions and future dust-related effects on the
environment, as well as reduce effects on traffic-induced caribou movement to the advantage of
Kivalina’s harvest of caribou. Concerning particulate matters, EPA asserts that it is highly unlikely that
the PM2.5 NAAQS is exceeded, but does not exclude that.); id.at 4 (the State of Alaska has proposed to
adopt the federal PM2.5 standard, although this has not yet been finalized. According to area
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population was undertaken by the Alaska Department of Fish and Game
Division of Habitat in 2011, and it seems to ambiguously reveal that heavy
metals were found in the Dolly Varden fish population in the Wulik
River.120 Yet, no sampling was undertaken in marine waters. The only
available sampling on marine water appears to date back to 2003, and was
published in 2007 but the ensuing assessment does not seem to be in the
public domain.121
Furthermore, the latest study concerning heavy metals on mosses and
soils can only be tracked to 2001, when the highest levels of heavy metal
concentrations were retrieved near the Red Dog Haul Road, prompting
evaluators to state that those levels equaled or exceeded (1.5 – 2.5 times)
“maxima reported for samples from severely polluted regions in Central
European countries.”122
Harvesting animals both at sea and in the tundra, Kivalina residents
have been concerned with possibly heightened blood lead level (BLL).123
The EPA did not address the issue in its Record of Decision, stating that
there was no baseline to contrast current BLLs against since no blood lead
levels were collected prior to the opening of the mine.124 In 2005, Teck and
ADEC signed a Memorandum, later amended in 2007, by which Teck
designation in 2006 (the latest issued) Northwest Arctic Borough is unclassifiable/attainment areas for
PM2.5 under Part C of the Clean Air Act (CAA)).
120. ALVIN G. OTT & WILLIAM A. MORRIS, AQUATIC BIOMONITORING AT RED DOG MINE
2010, ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME DIVISION OF HABITAT vi (2011) (the study on the
Dolly Varden fish concluded that it “is unlikely that tissue metals concentrations or changes could be
related to events at the Red Dog Mine since large Dolly Varden fishes attain their growth in the marine
environment.” However, ADEC Spill Division acknowledges that marine degradation principally
results from ore dust-blown pollution).
121. DIVISION OF SPILL PREVENTION AND RESPONSE CONTAMINATED SITES PROGRAM,
APPENDIX A 23 (2007); see STATE OF ALASKA CONTAMINATED SITES PROGRAM, supra note 82.
122. Jesse Ford & Linda Hasselbach, Heavy Metals in Mosses and Soils on Six Transects Along
the Red Dog Mine Haul Road, ALASKA (May 2001), http://dec.alaska.gov/spar/csp/docs/
reddog/reddogrpt2.pdf.
123. Elizabeth J. Kerin & Hsing K. Lin, Fugitive Dust and Human Exposure to Heavy Metals
around the Red Dog Mine, 206 REVIEWS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION AND TOXICOLOGY 60
(David M. Whitacre ed., Springer 2010) (residents do not appear to have blood levels of concern,
however no statistical analysis and no isotopic studies were undertaken for elucidating the
environmental source of blood level in children. Moreover, the last public health analysis dates back to
2001 and referred to blood tests undertaken in the 90s); see Public Health Evaluation of Exposure of
Kivalina and Notak Residents to Heavy Metals from Red Dog Mines, DIVISION OF SPILL PREVENTION
AND
RESPONSE
CONTAMINATED
SITES
PROGRAM,
http://dec.
alaska.gov/spar/csp/docs/reddog/publichealthexpos_102501.htm [https://perma.cc/HJA3-45EK] (last
visited Jan. 15, 2017) [hereinafter Heavy Metals].
124. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 78; see Jason Prno &D. D.
Slocombe, 'A Systems-Based Conceptual Framework for Assessing the Determinants of a Social License
to Operate in the Mining Industry' 53 ENVTL. MGMT. 672 (2014).
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committed to hammer out and implement a fugitive dust risk management
plan.125 The latter gave rise to a series of Annual Management Plan
Reports, the latest of which is from 2013 and refers to a 2007 human health
and ecological risk assessment undertaken by Teck-contracted Exponent.126
The human health risk assessment stated that harvesting remained off limits
only within the DMTS, and the ecological risk assessment evaluated
potential risks to “ecological receptors inhabiting terrestrial, freshwater
stream and pond, coastal lagoon, and marine environments from exposure
to DMTS-related metals,” therefore also at the port site.127 No specific
action, however, was undertaken.
C. A Proposed Solution at International Law
The mixed fuel of domestic and international law, as proposed in
Section II of this paper, is not intended to remain wishful thinking, but
should rather be tested in practice, and specifically in the Kivalina case.
I will first assess which water-related claims might not have found a
proper response in previous litigation. I will contend that this legal gap
could be filled by applying relevant international law norms, and
specifically the LOS Convention. Since its provisions can only be applied
in U.S. courts if they are proven customary, I will draw on political
statements, relevant case law and scholarship in order to prove that specific
environmental provisions of the LOS Convention have reached the rank of
customary rules. I will advocate for the adoption of the Charming Betsy
canon when invoking relevant federal law, namely NEPA, the CWA,
EPCRA, the Rivers and Harbors Act, as well as Alaska private nuisance
law. To my understanding, such interpretation of domestic law can be
embraced by U.S. courts, allowing for the recoup of damages to be awarded
to Kivalina people and the prevention of further pollution.

1. In the Aftermath of Domestic Litigation:
Prospective Outstanding Claims
In the following paragraph, I briefly summarize the main water-related
impacts of the mine sites on Kivalina residents that are still outstanding,
125. Elizabeth J. Kerin & Hsing K. Lin, supra note 123 (residents do not appear to have blood
levels of concern, however no statistical analysis and no isotopic studies were undertaken for elucidating
the environmental source of blood level in children. Moreover, the last public health analysis dates back
to 2001 and referred to blood tests undertaken in the 90s); see Heavy Metals, supra note 123.
2014),
pdf.

126. See Fugitive Dust Risk Management Plan 2013 Annual Report, RED DOG MINE (Nov.
https://dec.alaska.gov/spar/csp/sites/docs/2013_fugitivedustriskmanagementplan_annualreport.
127.

Id. at 8.
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either because they were not mitigated through domestic litigation or they
never achieved the status of legal claims.
As explained in Sections III.A and III.B, three factors have been and
are allegedly affecting inland and coastal waters, as well as Kivalina
residents’ life, namely (i) the water pollutants discharged from the mine
sites onto the Middle Fork Red Dog Creek, which confluences with the
Ikalukrock Creek and then flows into the Wulik River, the source of
Kivalina’s drinking water and a tributary of the Chukchi Sea; (ii) the
contamination of the fish population, which constitutes part of Kivalina’s
subsistence life, through effluents in the river, and ore deposits/possibly oil
spills at the port site; (iii) the contamination of marine waters and sediments
at the port site due to air pollution and possibly oil spills.
Some of these adverse impacts of the mine operations have already
been known, e.g., the exceedance of effluents discharges on the creeks.128
Some of these impacts have seemingly been overlooked, such as the
presence of petroleum and ore contamination at the port site.129 Past
litigation under both Alaska and federal law—albeit somewhat successful—
has not addressed specific issues, nor provided long-term solutions.
Some leeway left for effective litigation might revolve around the
following: (i) the need for compensating individuals, rather than the
executive branch, for noncompliance of Teck with environmental laws; (ii)
the need to increase permit standards and assess the impact of wastewater
discharges, oil spills and air-borne ore dust on the marine environment, at
least at the port site, since no follow-up ensued the 2007 ecological risk
assessment undertaken by Teck-contracted Exponent, which evaluated
potential risks to ecological receptors inhabiting terrestrial, freshwater
stream and pond, coastal lagoon, and marine environments from exposure
to DMTS-related metals; (iii) the need to tackle the presence of
hydrocarbon spills, even in localized areas, and primarily at the port site
since the site might well become a Superfund site130 if no proper action is
undertaken; (iv) the need for an Environmental Assessment in light of fresh
data to be collected, especially at the port site; (v) the tools that are
available for preventing the unlawful degradation of waters; (vi) the
feasibility of building a wastewater pipeline directly discharging on the
Chukchi Sea so that Kivalina’s residents’ drinking water would not risk
being contaminated; (vii) the protection of the marine ecosystem from
climate change, and the protection of Kivalina from submergence.

128.

See SHEARER, supra note 77, at 113.

129.

See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 78.

130. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability, 42 U.S.C. §§
9601–75 (2012).
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2. Possible Responses from International Law: A Case for the Law
of the Sea Convention
I now turn to the LOS Convention in order to test the hypothesis that I
put forward in Section I, namely whether outstanding water issues of
Kivalina can be addressed by way of a mixed fuel encompassing
international (substantive) law and U.S. (procedural and substantive) law.
The chosen international law instrument to be deployed in the case is
the LOS Convention, namely the most comprehensive, and successful,
instrument for protecting the seas. For the purpose of this paper, I will not
be able to offer a fair account of the Convention’s history, case law and
varied implementation.131 Rather, I will first overview the sections
specifically relevant to the case, give an account of the positioning of the
United States vis-à-vis the Convention and understand whether a case can
be made for the customary status of some of the Convention’s
environmental provisions.
Indeed, here lies a legal dilemma: the United States has never ratified
the Convention, but the ‘magic’132 of customary law has persuasively been
invoked with respect to specific sections of the Convention.
If it is true that the law of the sea is “as old as nations,”133 the modern
law of the sea is also the remarkable result of UNCLOS III, a nine-year
negotiated conference extending the efforts of the previous UNCLOS I and
II conferences.134 The Convention resulting from UNCLOS III notably
contains a comprehensive legal framework devoted to the protection and
preservation of the marine environment (Part XII), encompassing a variety
of provisions, among which general obligations, monitoring and
environmental assessment, international rules and national legislation to
prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment,
enforcement in general and provisions for the smooth coordination of the
LOS Convention with other conventions on the protection and preservation
of the marine environment.135

131. See generally JAMES B. MORELL, THE LAW OF THE SEA: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
1982 TREATY AND ITS REJECTION BY THE UNITED STATES (McFarland 1992); DAVID D. CARON &
HARRY N. SCHEIBER, BRINGING NEW LAW TO OCEAN WATERS (2004); HUGO CAMINOS ET AL., LAW OF
THE SEA, FROM GROTIUS TO THE INT’L TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA (Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers 2015).
132. Quoting Andrea Bianchi, Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L.
491 (2008).
133.

LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 212 (2d ed. 1979).

134. LORI F. DAMROSCH & SEAN D. MURPHY, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
1354 (West Academic 2014).
135.

Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 2, at art. 207.
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The United States signed and ratified all four UNCLOS I conventions.
It also actively engaged in UNCLOS III negotiations, yet an abrupt change
of posture occurred after the election of President Reagan, when, among
other opposition techniques, an internal U.S. policy review known as the
Green Book was being circulated at the Conference in early 1982, with the
proposal of over 100 amendments.136 On that account, President Reagan
considered the deep seabed provisions137 fatally flawed and in contrast with
his “free enterprise philosophy.”138 In July 1982, Reagan announced that he
would not sign the Convention, which nonetheless hit all previous records
with 117 countries signing on the very first day it was open to signature.139
As early as in 1983, Reagan announced that the United States regarded
the LOS Convention, save for the deep seabed mining provisions (Part XI),
as containing “provisions with respect to traditional uses of the oceans
which generally confirm existing maritime law and practice and fairly
balance the interests of all states.”140 Reagan sketched instances of the
traditional uses of the oceans as navigation, overflight, and generally all
high seas rights and freedoms that are not resource related.141 Quite
interestingly, the Declaration also encompassed a number of statements
concerning the marine environment, establishing a 200 nautical mile
Exclusive Economic Zone with a view to enable “the United States to take
limited additional steps to protect the marine environment,” specifically by
working “through the International Maritime Organization and other
appropriate international organizations to develop uniform international
measures for the protection of the marine environment while imposing no
unreasonable burdens on commercial shipping.”142
After the adoption of the Convention’s Implementing Agreement by
the U.N. General Assembly in 1994,143 the Convention was sent to the
Senate for advice and consent, which have not been given yet.144
Since this paper is geared toward judicial remedies, it is worth
considering whether U.S. courts have characterized the LOS Convention as
part of customary law. Firstly, I am going to tackle this issue by looking at
136. TED L. MCDORMAN, SALT WATER NEIGHBORS: INTERNATIONAL OCEAN LAW
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 101 (Oxford University Press 2009).
137.

Id. at 102.

138.

Id. at 103.

139.

Id. at 104; TETRA TECH, INC., supra note 102, at 99.

140.

Ronald Reagan, President, U.S. Statement on United States Oceans Policy (March 10,

141.

Id.

142.

Id.

143.

DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 134, at 1357.

144.

Id.

1983).
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courts’ understanding of the customary character of the LOS provisions in
light of the declarations made by the United States in that concern.
Secondly, I will turn to a tentative analysis of the customary character of
some of the LOS environmental provisions at international law and besides
the understanding that U.S. courts have had of the political branch position
on the issue.
With reference to the courts’ view on the U.S. Executive Branch
stance toward the LOS Convention, the Supreme Court has consistently
maintained that the United States has not ratified the Convention, “but has
recognized that its baseline provisions reflect customary international
law.”145 This understanding has prompted a District Court to note in Sarei
v. Rio Tinto, that the United States “is obliged to refrain from acts that
would defeat the object and purpose of the agreement,”146 specifically when
the norms at issue are customary norms reflected in Article 194(1) of the
LOS Convention, but dismissed the claim as non-justiciable, which was
overturned in appeals.147 Eventually the Supreme Court vacated the
appellate judgment and remanded the case to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for further consideration in light of Kiobel.148
The Appellate Judges affirmed the district court’s judgment upholding the
non-justiciable character of the claim for it being a political question and
rendered a judgment of dismissal with prejudice, which means any further
attempt to bring the same case to court is ruled out.149
Be that as it may, the finding of a customary character of specifically
Article 194(1) by the District Court was not contended, and will be material
to the Kivalina case, as I will explain further in this paragraph under the
prong of a general (non US-based) assessment of the customary nature of
some of the LOS Convention’s environmental provisions. Nevertheless, in
Sarei v. Rio Tinto, the district court approached the environmental claims of
the dispute by asking for and obtaining evidence of the linkage between the
mining corporation and the State where environmental violations
occurred,150 yet it later dismissed the case precisely because any such act
145. United States v. Alaska, 503 U.S. 569, 588 (1992) (citing Brief for United States 25, n.6)
(internal quotation omitted); Mayaguezanos por la Salud y el Ambiente v. United States, 198 F.3rd 297,
305 (1st Cir. 1999).
146. Sarei v. Rio Tinto Plc., 221 F. Supp 2d. 1116, 1116 (2002); see also Rio Tinto PLC et al.
v. Alexis Holyweek Sarei et al., 133 U.S. (2013); see also Sarei v. Rio Tinto Plc., 722 F.3d 1109, 1109
(9th Cir. 2013).
147.
148.
(2013)).

Rio Tinto, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1209.
Rio Tinto, 722 F.3d at 1109 (citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659

149.

Id. at 1207.

150.

OREN PEREZ, ECOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY AND GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: RETHINKING
Publ’g 2004).

THE TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT CONFLICT (Hart
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would fall under the act of state doctrine, making any claim non-justiciable.
Were the customary character of Article 194(1) to be put forward in future
claims, courts might be confused by the district court’s request of a linkage
between the corporation and the State in the perpetration of the alleged
environmental violations. Such a linkage would not be present in the
Kivalina case since the concession for exploiting mineral resources is
granted by a Nonprofit Organization, NANA Regional Corporation Inc.,
rather than by the state or the federal government, and the latter have no
part in the management of the mines.
As a separate strand from the U.S. positioning and practice, U.S.
courts might alternatively consider whether provisions show a customary
character at international law.151
Any such inquiry should follow the strict dicta put forward by the
Second Circuit in Kiobel, even more so in the context of environmental
cases since Kiobel was an environmental case also.152 The first step of the
evidentiary inquiry dwells on retrieving “international conventions, whether
general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by contesting
states,” which in this case is the LOS Convention.153 As Kiobel maintains,
the treaty’s evidentiary value for customary law depends on the number of
signatory parties and the parties’ relative influence on the issue,154 which
are quite numerous and would lead to the affirmative in the case of the LOS
Convention.155 Nonetheless, the further steps pointed out by Kiobel are not
as easy to assess since evidence of a custom also springs from a general
principle of law recognized by civilized nations; an international custom as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law; or judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most qualified publicists of the various nations, which
would only constitute subsidiary means for the determination of rule of law.
Since the Convention’s text was finalized and adopted, all countries
have agreed that many provisions parallel the provisions included in the
UNCLOS I Conventions, and even some of the provisions that had no
UNCLOS I counterpart are clearly established customary law.156 As of late
2014, 167 countries have become party to the Convention, and 147 of them
have become party to the Implementing Agreement.157 It is, however, safe
151.

Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 634.

152.

Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1660.

153.

Id. at 1161.

154.

Id. at 1166.

155.

Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 634.

156.

DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 134, at 1356.

157. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, BLUEBIRD, http://www.bluebirdelectric.net/oceanography/Ocean_Plastic_International_Rescue/United_Nations_Convention_On_The_
Law_Of_The_Sea_UNCLOS.htm (last visited Oct. 15 2016).
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to say that the UNCLOS I Conventions still govern States Parties to them,
but it also governs States Parties to the UNCLOS III Convention insofar as
the latter did not supersede the earlier Conventions.158 Since the 1958
Conventions are guides to the customary law of the sea governing States
not party to the convention, we now turn to those.159
The 1958 Convention on the High Seas, resulting from UNCLOS I,
encompasses several provisions seeking to ensure safety at sea (Article 10)
and the prevention of sea pollution by the discharge of oil from ships or
pipelines or resulting from the exploitation and exploration of the seabed
and its subsoil (Article 24), or even from the dumping of radioactive waste
(Article 25).160 It does not, however, comprise some of what UNCLOS III
would later cover, namely pollution from land-based sources, through the
atmosphere and from dumping at sea (Article 207 – 212), nor its
enforcement provisions, notably foreign vessels, by port countries (Article
218 covering pollution in the internal waters, territorial sea or exclusive
economic zone) and coastal countries (Article 220 covering pollution in the
territorial sea and exclusive economic zone).161
With reference to land-based sources of marine pollution (LBSMP),
which is material in the case of Kivalina, it was argued that customary law
is established as covering the principles and obligations of good
neighborliness and reasonable use of the seas.162 The same commentator,
however, also recalled the customary nature of Article 207 of the LOS
Convention (Pollution from land-based sources), which is eventually
deemed too general for effectively tackling this kind of pollution, but the
author did not set as his objective to provide a thorough account of all the
applicable provisions of the Convention to cases of land-based pollution
affecting the marine environment.163

158. MORAKINYO ADEDAYO AYOADE, DISUSED OFFSHORE INSTALLATIONS AND PIPELINES
TOWARDS “SUSTAINABLE DECOMMISSIONING” 56 (Kluwer Law Int’l eds., 2002); DAMROSCH &
MURPHY, supra note 134, at 1359.
159.

DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 134, at 1359.

160.

Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 2, at art. 10, 24, 25.

161. DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 134, at 1494; see Convention on the Law of the Sea,
supra note 2.
162. Daud Hassan. Land-Based Sources of Marine Pollution: The Global Framework for
Control AUSTL. INT’L L. J. 61, 62 (2003).
163. See id. (for retrieving soft law instruments relating to LBSMP, most notably Montreal
Guidelines for Protection of the Marine Environment against Pollution from Land-Based Sources,
Decision 13/18/li, Governing Council of Unep (May 24, 1985); Washington Declaration on Protection
of the Marine Environment from Land-Based Activities, a/51/116, Annex I, Appendix li (Nov. 3, 1995).
Further soft law instruments relevant to the environmental provisions of the LOS Convention are, inter
alia, Principles 7 and 21 of the Stockholm Declaration and Intergovernmental Working Group on
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In my view, the underused assets of the Convention’s environmental
provisions can be better retrieved in the repository of the general provisions
(Arts. 192 – 196). As sharply noted, Article 192 sets forth an obligation on
“States,” rather than “States Parties,” to “protect and preserve the marine
environment,”164 alternatively implying (i) the customary character of such
rule; (ii) obligations for third-State parties within the meaning of the 1969
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Articles 34 – 48 of the
VCLT);165 or, (iii) a general principle of international law, which is the
most favored option by commentators.166 The term pollution and dumping
are quite broadly defined in Article 1 of the LOS Convention.167 Article
192 of the LOS Convention seems to require active measures to maintain or
improve the marine environment,168 in “all parts of ocean space both within
and beyond the limits of any national jurisdiction.”169
Article 192 is further fleshed out in Article 194(1), whereby “States
shall take, individually or jointly as appropriate, all measures consistent”
with the Convention “that are necessary to prevent, reduce and control
pollution of the marine environment from any source, using for this purpose
the best practicable means at their disposal and in accordance with their
capabilities, and they shall endeavor to harmonize their policies in this
connection.”170 Again, the article appears applicable also to countries that
have not ratified the LOS Convention,171 and clearly refers to the need for
establishing international standards (also Article 213 – 222 of the LOS
Marine Pollution (IWFMP) Principles for Assessment and Control of Marine Pollution (1971),
a/Conf.48/lwgmp.li/5).
164. Myron H. Nordquist et al., Commentary, United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea 1982: A Commentary, Vol. IV, 39 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1985).
165.

1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.

166.

Nordquist et al., supra note 164.

167. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 2, at art. 1(1)(4) (pollution of the marine
environment means:
The introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the
marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to result in
such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to
human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other
legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and
reduction of amenities.
According to Article 1(1)(5)(a) dumping means “(i) any deliberate disposal of wastes or other
matter from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea; (ii) any deliberate disposal
of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea.”).
168.

Nordquist et al., supra note 164, at 40.

169.

Id. at 43.

170.

Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 2, at art. 1, ¶ 1.

171.

Nordquist et al., supra note 164, at 64.
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Convention), to be enforced through national organs, whether judicial or
not.172 Most notably, Article 194(3) provides that prevention/protection
measures should be applied in relation to a number of circumstances, and,
for the purposes of this paper, “(a) the release of toxic, harmful or noxious
substances, especially those which are persistent, from land-based sources,
from or through the atmosphere or by dumping; (b) pollution from vessels,”
taking into consideration vessels’ construction, equipment, operation and
manning.173 Pursuant to Article 194(5), the required measures “shall
include those necessary to protect and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems as
well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered species and other
forms of marine life,” which is specifically suited to the ecosystems in and
around Kivalina.174
Nonetheless, what is most important to assess is the host of
international standards that would allow these provisions to be specific
enough, in the light of the Sosa decision, to supplement domestic rules.
With relation to pollution from vessels, MARPOL175 would fill in the gap
or suggest an increase of domestic standards through its six technical
annexes requiring preventive measures covering five categories of
substances, as well as a Protocol concerning Reports on Incidents Involving
Harmful Substances.176 Differently, with relation to the inadequacy of
water permit standards, further standards cannot be provided by the
Convention on Biological Diversity, since the United States signed it in
1993, but never ratified it.177 Rather, possibly applicable provisions can be
retrieved in the LOS Convention itself, and specifically in Article 204(1),
which sets forth the obligation for “States” to “observe, measure, evaluate
and analyze, by recognized scientific methods, the risks or effects of
pollution of the marine environment.”178
Furthermore, pursuant to Article 204(2) of the LOS Convention, States
shall “keep under surveillance the effects of any activities which they
permit or in which they engage in order to determine whether these
activities are likely to pollute the marine environment.”179 The obligation
172.

Id. at 65.

173.

Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 2, at art. 194, ¶ 3.

174.

Id. ¶ 5.

175. See generally International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(Marpol), Nov. 2, 1973, S. Exec. Doc. C, 95-1, 1340 U.N.T.S. 184.
176. MYRON H. NORDQUIST ET AL, UNCLOS 1982 COMMENTARY SUPPLEMENTARY
DOCUMENTS 803 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2012).
177. Robert F. Blomquist, Ratification Resisted: Understanding American’s Response to the
Convention on Biological Diversity, 1989–2002, 32 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 493 (2002).
178.

Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 2, at art. 204, ¶ 1.

179.

Id. at art. 204, ¶ 2.
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to carry out an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) was acknowledged
as customary in character under certain circumstances by the ICJ in the
Pulp Mills case,180 and a domestic court might be able to flesh out the
content of Article 204 of the LOS Convention by mandating EIAs on
environmental agencies, even when the activities have been permitted but
long-term effects were not duly/possibly anticipated.
All in all, Article 192, Article 194 and Article 204 of the LOS
Convention, as supplemented by further instruments at international law,
are seemingly apt to be applied also in domestic settings, on ground of their
fairly established customary character and specificity.181 With reference to
the U.S. judicial setting, specificity would be needed for these provisions to
meet the Sosa test and therefore be applied either directly as a rule or
indirectly as a standard within the canon of interpretation (the Charming
Betsy canon). Moreover, the holding by which Article 194 of the LOS
Convention partakes in customary law has never been invalidated through
the Sarei v. Rio Tinto case law.182
Be that as it may, this conceptual framework is now to be applied to
the specificities of Kivalina’s prospective claims.

3. The LOS Convention at Play in Kivalina
In the following paragraph, I specifically address the water issues that
I have previously characterized as still outstanding for Kivalina residents in
light of my contention on the customary character of Articles 192, 194 and
204 of the LOS Convention. I will eventually argue that specific legal
claims may be brought to the competent U.S. courts, or environmental
administrations, mainly by relying on specific provisions of the LOS
Convention.
Such legal claims would be targeted to the following objectives: (i) to
achieve compensation for individuals; (ii) to increase the environmental
standards contained in the relevant permits and assess the impact of
wastewater discharges, oil spills and air-borne ore dust on the marine
environment, at least at the port site in that the last ecological risk
assessment dates back to 2007, was undertaken by Teck-contracted
Exponent and it eventually emphasized potential risks to ecological
receptors inhabiting terrestrial, freshwater stream and pond, coastal lagoon,
180.
(Apr. 10).

Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 204

181. See DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 134, at 1493 (reporting that the works of the
International Law Commission have only analyzed customary norms with relation to transboundary
damage prevention and allocation of loss, as well as in transboundary aquifers context).
182. Sosa, 124 U.S. at 2763 (requiring a specific, universal, and obligatory content for rules to
be the law of nations under the ATS); Sarei, 722 F.3d at 1109.
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and marine environments from exposure to metals related to the operation
of the mine; (iii) to assess the presence of hydrocarbon spills, even if in
localized areas, and primarily at the port site since no official documents
have been issued apparently on this concern; (iv) to undertake an
Environmental Assessment in light of fresh data to be collected, especially
at the port site; v) to understand which tools are available for preventing the
unlawful degradation of waters; (vi) to assess the feasibility of the
construction of a wastewater pipeline directly discharging on the Chukchi
Sea so that Kivalina’s residents drinking water would not risk being
contaminated; and (vii) to ensure the protection of the marine ecosystem
from climate change, and the protection of Kivalina from submergence.
I will eventually argue that Kivalina residents might resort to three
avenues, and specifically to (a) a private nuisance action before an Alaska
state court and an ATS action before a federal court for point (i); (b) a
request for the issuance/re-issuance, modification and revocation of permits
and the right to petition for points (ii), (iii) and (iv); (c) a citizens’ suit
based on the violation of the NPDES permit and an EPCRA183 action for
point (v). I did not find, however, a way to address points (vi) and (vii) by
relying on the customary provisions of the LOS Convention.
With reference to the need for compensating individuals, the CWA
spells out the right for citizens to sue in section 505, with no possibility to
be awarded damages in case of violation of the wastewater permit, i.e., the
NPDES permit.184
Alaska’s Civil Code of Procedure allows individuals to bring a civil
action to enjoin or abate a private nuisance, with damages awarded in the
action.185 Such remedy has not been displaced by the CWA, according to
section 505 (e) CWA.186 In case of actions connected to air emission or
water or solid waste discharge, which would be the case for Kivalina
people, an action would be barred “where the emission or discharge was
expressly authorized by and is not in violation of a term or condition of (1)
a statute or regulation; or (2) a license, permit, or order that is issued after
public hearing by the state or federal government and subject to (i)
continuing compliance monitoring; (ii) periodic review by the issuing
agency; or (iii) renewal on a periodic basis; or (3) a court order or
judgment.”187
Kivalina residents might contend that no continuing compliance
monitoring nor periodic review has been warranted at the port site, nor a
183.

Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–50 (2012).

184.

Clean Water Act, supra note 95, § 505.

185.

Action Based on Private Nuisance, ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.230(a) (2011).

186.

Clean Water Act, supra note 95, at § 505(e).

187.

§ 09.45.230(b).
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periodic renewal of the permit for the operation of the port has been
undertaken since the NPDES renewal ensuing the approval of the Aqqaluk
project arguably refers only to discharges on the Middle Fork Red Dog
Creek, neglecting discharges at the port and the effect that the discharge of
increased effluents on the Middle Fork Red Dog Creek has on the port site.
Nevertheless, plaintiffs need to work very carefully to (i) show substantial
harm, probably by referring to the effects of water pollutants on the animals
they harvest and the fallouts of air pollutants on their own health, as well as
(ii) negligence or reckless conduct.188
Such actions are not apparently displaced by the Clean Water Act in
that the Supreme Court referenced to Ouellette189 in a dicta of American
Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut190 asserting that the Clean Water Act
does not preclude aggrieved individuals from bringing a “nuisance claim
pursuant to the law of the source State.”191
Be that as it may, Articles 192, 194, and 204 of the LOS Convention
would not need to be directly applied, but rather invoked for the consistent
interpretation with international law of Alaska’s provisions on private
nuisance (Charming Betsy canon).192 Most notably, the three LOS
provisions would imply a need for stringent monitoring and permit renewal
in order to protect and preserve the marine environment, and Kivalina
residents could bring a private nuisance action concerning all three
outstanding claims that I identified previously. As for most international
agreements, provisions are not binding on private parties, be they either
individuals or corporations, but rather on States Parties.193 Still, by
applying the Charming Betsy canon, the analyzed LOS Convention
provisions would not be apt to horizontal application (private-to-private
claim), but rather would specify both state and federal legislation as they
belong to the law of the land and should therefore be enforced.194
With reference to the first outstanding claim, namely the water
pollutants discharged from the mine sites onto the Middle Fork Red Dog
Creek, which are alleged to impact the source of Kivalina’s drinking water
and possibly also the Chukchi Sea, any violation of the NPDES might
trigger a private nuisance claim in that Kivalina residents might show
substantial harm and recklessness/negligence of the violating conducts,
188.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 822 (1979); Fernandes v. Portwine, 56 P.3d 1 (Alaska

189.

International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 107 U.S. 805 (1987).

190.

American Elec. Power Company Inc., v. Connecticut, 131 U.S. 2527, 2540 (2011).

191.

Ouellette, 107 U.S. at 497.

192.

Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 2, at art. 192, 194, 204.

193.

Id. at art. 192, 194, 204.

194.

Id.
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which are further aggrieving given the lack of notification of such events,
as it turned out in 2014.195 Article 194(3) of the LOS Convention would
help construe some of the terms of Alaska private nuisance rules, and
specifically the reference to “continuing compliance monitoring,” “periodic
review by the issuing agency” or “renewal on a periodic basis,”196 which
should cover “(a) the release of toxic, harmful or noxious substances,
especially those which are persistent, from land-based sources, from or
through the atmosphere or by dumping,” as set forth in Article 194(3)(a) of
the LOS Convention.197 By leveraging on the threat of private nuisance
claims, companies might be incentivized to voluntarily put in place such
customary-based monitoring mechanisms even when the permit does not
require them to do so.198
In relation to the second outstanding claim, namely the contamination
of the fish population, which constitutes part of Kivalina’s subsistence life,
through effluents in the river, and ore deposits/possibly oil spills at the port
site, the monitoring apparatus necessary for avoiding a threat of private
nuisance claims would consist of mechanisms “to protect and preserve rare
or fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or
endangered species and other forms of marine life,” pursuant to Article
194(5) of the LOS Convention, which is particularly apt for the fragile
ecosystem of Alaska.199 On Kivalina’s facts, no recent impact statement on
the fish population at the port site is currently available.
Also with respect to the third outstanding claim, namely the
contamination of marine waters and sediments at the port site due to air
pollution/possibly oil spills, in order not to be liable for a private nuisance
claim, Teck would be required to comply with Article 194(5) of the LOS
Convention, assessing the impact of vessels and discharges on the “fragile
ecosystems” of the port, as well as the “habitat of depleted, threatened or
endangered species and other forms of marine life.”200 More importantly,
Teck itself is in charge of operating the port. In order to avoid pollution
from vessels, Teck would be spurred on to evaluate which MARPOL
protocols have been domesticated in the U.S. legal system, as well as to
assess whether any such obligation is binding on private port authorities as
well.
What is most interesting about Alaska’s Code of Civil Procedure is the
fact that the foregoing restrictions on private nuisance actions do not apply
195.

Clean Water Act, supra note 95.

196.

§ 09.45.230(a).

197.

Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 2, at art. 194.

198.

See generally § 09.45.230(a).

199.

Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 2, at art. 194.

200.

Id.
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if the discharge produces a result that was unknown or not reasonably
foreseeable at the time of the authorization.201 Therefore, if Kivalina
residents were able to prove the unknown result/not reasonably foreseeable
effect of the discharge, they would be able to succeed in the action, even
when the relevant judge deems the level of monitoring and permit renewal
sufficient. Unfortunately, it is not possible to make any prediction on the
environmental impact of the mine operations on the port site in that data are
lacking. Nevertheless, permit and monitoring do not appear to have been
periodic. This might suggest that nuisance conducts were unknown or not
reasonably foreseeable at the time of the authorization, allowing private
nuisance actions to be brought with no restriction. By qualifying the
polluting conduct as “an action for waste or trespass upon real property”
and in light of Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in Fernandes v. Portwine,
the statute of limitations appears to be six years.202
With reference to the ATS claim, an alien should file it, so there
should be at least one person within the Kivalina community having
multiple citizenships/a foreign citizenship and being willing to file the
claim. Yet, no case law has been retrieved on standing for U.S. citizens
filing the ATS claim as foreign nationals on account of multiple
citizenships.
On the likelihood of succeeding in court, the Sarei v. Rio Tinto
litigation would not be a legitimate precedent.203 Although the Court did
not rule out the customary nature of the LOS Convention, and specifically
Article 194, Kiobel204 is still an overpowering legacy and might dispel
purely environmental law-based ATS claims without a specific
differentiation between human right-based and environmental law-based
claims. Given the non-extraterritorial character of a prospective ATS claim
brought by Kivalina residents, however, the outcome might not be impacted
by Kiobel. Yet, the Sosa standards for a customary rule to apply would still
need to be met. ATCA contains no limitations period, yet this does not
imply there is none and court practice is varied in this regard.205
201.

§ 09.45.230(c) (2011).

202.

Fernandes, 56 P.3d at 5.

203.

See Sarei, 722 F.3d at 1110.

204.

See generally Kiobel, 133 U.S. 1659.

205. See Sosa 124 U.S. 2739 at 2766 (according to Sosa, in order to be applied under the
ATCA international law norms need be “specific, universal and obligatory.”); see Wesley Papa v. U.S.
and the U.S. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 281 F.3d 1004, 1011–13 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Doe v. Islamic
Salvation Front, 257 F. Supp. 2d 115, 118–19 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F.
Supp. 2d 424, 461–66 (D.N.J 1999) (the case-law on the relevant statute of limitations for an ATCA
claim is varied, usually being a ten-year time bar in analogy to the Torture Victims Protection Act
(TVPA)); see In re Agent Orange Prod. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 63–64 (E.D.N.Y 2005) (it appears that
in this instance only a federal court held that “there are no statutes of limitation with respect to war
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As a second prong of litigation, Kivalina residents might petition for
the re-issuance, modification, and revocation of permits pursuant to specific
environmental regulations,206 which are also applicable to state programs.207
In the case of Alaska, the NPDES permit program is administered at the
state level.208 This prong of litigation is not per se judicial, however, it
might become so in case the petition is denied with no reasonable ground in
light of the holdings of Massachusetts v. EPA.209
Under this prong, the analyzed LOS Convention provisions would be
directly binding on the relevant level of government in the permit process,
rather than on a corporation, such as Teck.210 A corporation would,
however, be indirectly affected by the application of those provisions at the
governmental level, which would result in higher environmental
standards.211
Most specifically, with regard to section 402 CWA (stormwater)
permit, which is required for the discharge of water pollutants on the
Middle Fork Red Dog Creek, Kivalina plaintiffs will need to petition the
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation. Kivalina plaintiffs are
in the position to ask for more stringent effluents limits, which would
counter the lowering of some of the effluent standards in the latest NPDES
permit, which were challenged unsuccessfully.212 Such a right to petition is
enshrined in the Code of Federal Regulations and can be better fleshed out
by relying on the need for states to “take, individually or jointly as
appropriate, all measures consistent” with the LOS Convention “that are
necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine
environment from any source, using for this purpose the best practicable
means at their disposal and in accordance with their capabilities, and they
shall endeavor to harmonize their policies in this connection” (Article
194(1) LOS Convention).213 On the same ground, Kivalina residents might
require a modification of the current system of NPDES enforcement, which
crimes and other violations of international law”); Jan Arno Hessbruegge, Justice Delayed, Not Denied:
Statutory Limitations & Human Rights Crimes, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 2, 381 (2012); but cf. J. Romesh
Weeramantry, Time Limitation Under the United States Alien Tort Claims Act, INT’L COMMITTEE RED
CROSS 627, 632 (2003).
206.
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40 C.F.R. § 123.25 (2015).

208. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Memorandum of Agreement Between
State of Alaska & U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Alaska DEC 3 (Oct. 29, 2008).
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presently provides a mechanism of self-compliance by Teck coupled with
periodic inspections on the part of the Administration. Enhanced controls
on the part of either ADEC or third parties that have been assessed as truly
neutral could provide a better enforcement system.
With regard to section 404 CWA (dredge-and-fill) permit, which is
required for the operation of the Aqqaluk deposit and probably also at the
port site, yet the latest point is not apparent, the relevant authority to
petition would be the Army Corps of Engineers, Alaska District.214 The
aim would still be to petition for increased environmental standards and
more frequent controls on the governmental side.
Moreover, Kivalina residents would also need to petition the Army
Corps of Engineers, Alaska, for a Rivers and Harbors section 10 permit for
the operation of the port site in that it does not appear to be in place. By
way of difference from the CWA, the right to petition is not specifically
granted in the Rivers and Harbors Act.215 Such a right should be derived
from the general right to petition as enshrined in the Right to Petition
Clause contained in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the
petition would be substantiated by relying on Article 204(1) of the LOS
Convention (Charming Betsy canon), which sets forth the obligation for
“States” to “observe, measure, evaluate and analyze, by recognized
scientific methods, the risks or effects of pollution of the marine
environment,” namely the activities that are required for the issuance of a
Rivers and Harbors section 10 permit.216
All in all, pursuant to Article 204(2) of the LOS Convention, States
shall “keep under surveillance the effects of any activities which they
permit or in which they engage in order to determine whether these
activities are likely to pollute the marine environment.”217 This obligation
appears specifically stringent in the context of permit issuance, re-issuance,
modification, and revocation, all the more so at the port site, which was not
covered by the latest Supplemental Environmental Impact Assessment.
Since the project is subject to NEPA, one further line of petitioning
might dwell on the request for an Environmental Assessment to be carried
out at the port site according to specific environmental regulations.218
Moreover, the same LOS Convention provision, as complemented with the
Pulp Mill judgment,219 can be construed as requiring recurrent or at least
precautionary Environmental Assessments. On Kivalina’s facts, citizens
214.

Clean Water Act, supra note 95, § 404.

215.
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may petition for an Environmental Assessment concerning the impact of
Middle Fork Red Dog Creek’s discharges on the Chukchi Sea, and
specifically at the port site, which was not analyzed by the latest SEIS.
With concern to the permit process, Kivalina residents might also
petition for the withdrawal of approval from the programs that have been
delegated to Alaska, under both the stormwater (section 402(c)(3)) and
dredge-and-fill (section 404(i)) programs.220 Even in these cases, the right
to petition would need be grounded on the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and substantiated within the activities mandated by Article
204(2) of the LOS Convention.
Under the third prong of action, namely citizens’ suits and civil
actions, Kivalina residents may bring a suit against any person alleged to be
in violation of water-related permits,221 immediately for violations of
NPDES or toxic effluents standards,222 and in general after sixty days from
when the plaintiff has given notice of the alleged violation to the
Administrator, the State, and the alleged violator.223
Nonetheless, any such action is barred if the Administrator or State
“has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action.”224
Kivalina residents were able to meet the standing prongs in previous
NPDES litigation, therefore they are likely to meet them also at this time.
Such a citizen enforcement action, however, could only be targeted to stop
permit violations, since it does not allow citizens to recoup damages, but
only litigation costs.225
A citizens’ suit may also be brought against the EPA Administrator on
a failure to perform any act or duty.226 Such a strand of litigation, however,
is specifically difficult to pursue in that the duty/act should be nondiscretionary. On Kivalina’s facts, the Administrator’s duty can be fleshed
out in the obligation to update and tighten up the NPDES and dredge-andfill permits, as well as in the duty to carry out/update an environmental
assessment at the port in light of the obligation for States, pursuant to Art.
194(1), to “prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment
from any source, using for this purpose the best practicable means at their
disposal and in accordance with their capabilities.”227 Yet, the means for
accomplishing these duties are discretionary. Besides, this strand of
220.
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litigation would not specifically benefit from the consistent interpretation of
the CWA with the customary environmental provisions of the LOS
Convention.
This prong of litigation also rests on the civil actions’ provision set
forth in EPCRA,228 which can be filed against either the violator or the
State Administrator. Such actions, nonetheless, are geared toward a
different goal from the one set in the CWA, and precisely compliance with
reporting obligations, also in case of accidental chemical release under the
Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) Program. The EPA would investigate cases
of EPCRA non-compliance and may issue civil penalties, including
monetary fines, and require correction of the violations. On Kivalina’s
facts, citizens can certainly file such an action were a violation of the
NPDES to occur without Teck stating an emergency notice, as it happened
in 2014.229 This specific prong of litigation, however, would not require the
application of the Charming Betsy canon with reference to the LOS
Convention, since the latter could not add much to such a specific piece of
legislation. Citizens would not be able to recoup damages, but they can still
count on the further means of an injunctive relief.230
Likewise, I do not see how the actual construction of a wastewater
pipeline directly discharging into the Chukchi Sea can be mandated by
wielding on LOS Convention provisions. Therefore, this specific claim of
Kivalina people cannot be advanced by relying on the LOS Convention.
The last outstanding claim that I have put forward is the protection of
the marine ecosystem from climate change, and the protection of Kivalina
from submergence. I believe that both concerns might come under the
ambit of the specific solicitude that States need to show for “rare or fragile”
ecosystems (Article 194(4) LOS Convention)231 and climate change
considerations should be internalized within a new EIS232 according to
NEPA and Article 204 of the LOS Convention. Notwithstanding, I cannot
see how greenhouse gas emissions, namely the cause for Kivalina’s
prospective submergence, might be curbed by relying on the LOS
Convention. Therefore, this prong of litigation cannot rely on the
Charming Betsy canon, as applied to the LOS Convention.
A specific concern might be addressed at policy level, which is the
environmental justice posture of the present case. The landmark executive
order issued by President Clinton in 1994 prompts all federal agencies to
228.
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carry out a review of their internal decision-making procedures to
incorporate consideration of environmental justice issues therein. Such an
executive order will not create a right of action for Kivalina people, still the
concerns it addresses must be adequately incorporated in such federal
executive actions as an environmental statement/EIS under NEPA.233
All in all, I contend that it is possible to flesh out rules of diligence at
both company level (Teck), and governmental level (State and Federal
government) by way of a consistent interpretation of domestic legislation
with the specific provisions resulting from the customary rules of the LOS
Convention, namely Article 192, Article 194 and Article 204. In this way,
companies, such as Teck, might anticipate the risk of litigation, especially
under the private nuisance prong, and undertake actions to exceed permits’
requirements. Similarly, under the administrative prong, in case the
relevant authorities refusal to reissue modify or revoke permits, courts
might pay less deference to the executive branch under the Chevron
doctrine, or at least frame deference within the limit of political discretion
and claim jurisdiction to rule on how the agency is fulfilling its duties in
light of the environmental rules of the LOS Convention, which have been
ascertained as customary in character.234
Nevertheless, in any thread of litigation one should carefully balance
the opposing interests of full environmental soundness and public health
safety with the economic prosperity Teck is bringing to the area. In all the
foregoing legal argumentations, legal counsels should emphasize the need
for tackling pending environmental issues as they appear now in order to
avoid future litigation costs, epidemiological diseases, reclamation costs,
and internal opposition from Native American workers at Teck.
In conclusion, and especially in light of the historical trajectory of the
stance U.S. courts have taken vis-à-vis international law and its judicial
enforceability, I would not recommend a litigation strategy that depends on
the direct application of the LOS Convention environmental provisions, but
rather on the application of the Charming Betsy canon while applying
relevant domestic legislation and regulations.
IV. TAKING STOCK
In this paper, I have attempted to analyze how a specific case of
environmental injustice can be addressed by hinging on international law
provisions.
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The case of environmental injustice is now unfolding around the
largest zinc mine worldwide, Alaska’s Red Dog Mine, and is specifically
impacting the Native Alaskan Kivalina community. The latter has long
battled against environmental degradation under U.S. law, with no apparent
success. In light of the impasse of purely domestic remedies, I have
focused on the water-related issues of the litigation and argued that
international law might equip plaintiffs with stronger arguments allowing
for the implementation of international law in U.S. courts.
Most notably, I have made the case for specific pieces of U.S.
environmental legislation being interpreted consistently with the
environmental provisions of the Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention. The
LOS Convention is of interest to the case not only by the fact that it is
strictly relevant to the subject matter, but also because of the customary
character of some of its provisions, as acknowledged by U.S. courts and
scholarship.
Some issues, however, are still outstanding, even at the end of my
analysis.
It still must be proven that the ICJ Pulp Mill decision can be extended
to the imperative of undertaking recurrent or even precautionary
environmental assessments. Moreover, I have not tested the potential of the
LOS Convention on all the possibly applicable pieces of environmental
legislation. For instance, I did not assess its impact on the interpretation of
some of the provisions of the Safe Drinking Water Act. Furthermore, I
have not tested the potential of all LOS applicable provisions either. The
understanding of how the LOS Convention can be intertwined with climate
change instruments is specifically compelling, but worth a brand new
chapter.
The quest for justiciable rights and competent courts to assess them is
ultimately intended to enhance awareness on the part of the national
judiciary of its entrustment as interpreter of the whole of the relevant law,
be it both domestic and international. Moreover, this attempt of
domestic/international solutions to current environmental issues might also
serve the cause of the international legal order, where enforcement is often
problematic. It can also conjure up the threat of litigation costs that
companies may incur in case such litigation claims prove successful,
enabling companies to prevent environmental degradation in the first place.
Lastly, and more importantly, the domestic staging of environment-related
claims against the backdrop of international law would set individuals, and
not only States, as recipients and actors of international law, hopefully
equipping them with further tools to advance their rights.

